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I. Introduction
The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled not only the collapse of Communism
as an economic and political ideal, but also the collapse of the centrally planned welfare
state that was conceived to bring the world economy out of the Great Depression of the
1930s. Significant privatization of state-owned assets actually began in 1984 when the
Thatcher government in the United Kingdom sold off its control of British Telecom., Then
privatizations on a massive scale in both developed and developing countries, and especially
in former Communist countries, occurred over the past decade.2 Accompanying this pri-
vatization and a general transformation of the world economy to a market economy, albeit
with varying degrees of government interference remaining, has been the creation of new
capital markets and reform of regnlatory systems governing securities issuances and financial
intermediaries and markets.
Privatizations of state-owned enterprises have put a huge supply of new equity capital
into the international equity markets. The next few decades are likely to witness a significant
new demand for equity capital resulting from the privatization of government pensions that
began in Chile in 1981 and has spread to some other developing countries. Although pen-
sion privatization has not yet spread to the G-10 countries, demographics and budgetary
constraints in the United States, Europe, and Japan are likely to lead to a full or partial
* Roberta S. Karmel is a Professor and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of International Business
Law at Brooklyn Law School and Of Counsel to Kelley Drye & Warren LLP. She is a former Commissioner
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. A research stipend from Brooklyn Law School was of assistance
in the preparation of this article. The assistance of Brooklyn Law School student Ronen Sarraf is gratefully
acknowledged.
I. See Catherine Curran Butcher, Telecommunications in the European Union, 48 ADmIN. L. REV. 451, 458-59
(1996).
2. See, e.g., Laura Conner, Telecommunications in Formerly Communist Countries, 48 ADMiN. L. REv. 463 (1996);
Frank Lynch, The Privatization of the Transportation Industry in Formerly Communist Countries: A Study of Poland
and Hungary, 48 ADMiN. L. REv. 559 (1996).
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privatization of state pension programs. And although a variety of models for such priva-
tization have been proposed and are being debated, virtually all of the models involve some
private sector investment decision-making and the investment of savings into corporate
equity securities.
Part II of this article will discuss the demographic, economic, and political developments
that are leading to the privatization of government pensions and will set forth the most
popular privatization models. This is a complex and hotly debated subject, and the author
will not attempt to draw any conclusions with regard to the merits or drawbacks of a free
market individually funded and directed pension system. Rather, this article will lay the
foundation for a conclusion that substantial retirement savings will flow into the equity
markets as a result of restructuring of government pension systems in many countries.
Further, the author will argue that despite current limitations on foreign investment, future
capital flows will and should go cross-border. Accordingly, capital from mature aging econ-
omies will flow into transition economies and capital from transition economies will be
invested not only in privatized and new local enterprises, but also in developed foreign
economies.
The remainder of Part II will discuss some of the ways in which securities regulators
need to prepare for these new pools of equity investment and how capital market regulation
may respond to the new pension architecture. Although the United States securities laws
will be used as a model, international standards will be referenced where they exist or are
developing.
Part III will discuss issuer financial disclosure and governance standards. Part TV will
discuss the regulation of financial markets. Although the regulation of financial interme-
diaries is an extremely important subject, it will not be discussed at length in this article
since in most countries this is the responsibility of banking or other regulators. However,
Part IV will include some observations on the need for regulation of investment decision-
making by collective investment funds and pension fund administrators, and insurance to
protect against intermediary insolvency, if a state embarks upon pension privatization. Fi-
nally, Part V will touch on the need to dismantle current impediments to the cross-border
investment of pension assets in order to put into place prudent investor standards.
H. Experiments with and Debates about Privatization
A. LATIN AMERICA
In 1981, General Augusto Pinochet's government, with the assistance of some American-
trained "Chicago School" free market economists, radically restructured the Chilean pen-
sion system so that it was transformed from a pay-as-you-go defined benefit system to an
individually directed defined contribution system. 3 Although the Chilean government man-
dates deductions from workers' salaries, and guarantees a minimum pension to those who
fail to accumulate sufficient savings, retirement account savings are managed by private
mutual funds, not the government.4 Investments are divided between government-backed
debt, interest bearing deposits, and stocks.' The new system was established because Chile's
3. Peter Passell, How Chile Farms Out Nest Eggs; Can Its Private Pension Plan Offer Lessons to the U.S.?, N.Y.
TiMES, Mar. 21, 1997, at D1.
4. See id.
5. See id.
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unfunded pension liabilities were subject to a demographic time bomb, payroll taxes were
an unpopular twenty-five percent, and the pension reform meshed well with efforts to jump-
start Chile's small domestic capital market.
6
The Chilean experiment has been vaunted for increasing the nation's savings rate and
solving the social security budgetary crisis, but stock market declines and other problems
have somewhat dimmed the luster of this model for pension reform. 7 Nevertheless, this
model has been widely copied in Latin America, and also is viewed as a solution for the
problems of pension programs confronting Eastern Europe.
Although Chile has been used as a model for emulation, there are different paradigms
for the features of an ideal pension system. The International Labor Organization devel-
oped a three-pillar paradigm where the first pillar is a mandatory, pay-as-you-go system,
financed by taxes, providing a universal subsistence pension, and administered by the state.
The second pillar is a mandatory defined benefit plan financed by employers and employees,
and administered by social insurance. The third pillar is a state regulated but voluntary
feature, financed by employers and employees, providing non-defined or supplementary
pensions administered by private sector institutions.8 According to the World Bank, how-
ever, there should not be a first pillar because it might not be financially viable and could,
among other things, obstruct the development of the capital market. The World Bank,
therefore, offered four alternatives, each one combining a public system and a mandatory
savings plan.9 An analysis of pension fund structural reforms in eight Latin American coun-
tries revealed considerable variations, but each of them provided at least the option of a
fully funded individually defined contribution plan.
Of importance to this article are features of private sector administration, investment
diversification and yields, payout provisions, and effect on the capital markets. In Bolivia,
Chile, El Salvador, and Peru, defined contribution plans are administered by private for-
profit corporations and in the remaining countries there are a multiplicity of administrators
including private for-profit and non-profit institutions, social security institutions, banks,
insurance companies, unions, and cooperatives. 0 There is a positive relationship between
the size of the market and the number of administrators." Although the insured is given
freedom to choose administrators, that latitude varies from one country to the next. Un-
fortunately investment yield does not necessarily drive the selection of administrators. 2
Investment yields generally do not include the cost of commissions (which are high) and
generally reflect the performance of world stock and bond markets." Limits on the type of
investments that can be made in order to accomplish a healthy diversification is a feature
of all of the Latin systems.14 The bulk of investments in the majority of countries, however,
6. See id.
7. See Jonathan Friedland, Chile's Celebrated Pension-Fund System Has Growing Pains as Returns Decline, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 12, 1997, at AI0; Pension Reform: A Model Shows Its Age, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 1997, at 78; Not-
So-Wondrous Pensions, ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 1996, at 46.
8. See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Comparative Analysis of Structural Pension Refrm in Eight Latin American Coun-
tries: Description, Evaluation and Lessons, in CAPITALIZATION: THE BOLIVIAN MODEL OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
REFORM 381, 389 (Margaret H. Pierce ed., 1997).
9. See id. at 390.
10. See id. at 430.
11. See id. at 431.
12. See id. at 433.
13. See id. at 437.
14. Seeid. at 434-35.
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is required to be made in domestic public debt instruments, a limitation the World Bank
has questioned." Disability and death benefits are generally handled by insurance compa-
nies. 6 In Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay, at the time of retirement the
insured has three options: a life annuity paid by an insurance company; a programmed
pension for a number of years; and an annuity later. 7
The World Bank, and all countries that have introduced some type of defined contri-
bution system component, claim that it will significantly increase national savings. However,
the evidence of such growth is somewhat mixed due in part to the costs of transition and
administration." The market, private administration, and freedom to select administrators
do not necessarily secure competition, compliance, and low administrative costs.' 9 One
expert has, therefore, recommended that the establishment of securities and insurance com-
missioners precede pension reforms20 Further, where reform is in place or about to begin,
investment restrictions should be deregulated in order to encourage portfolio diversification
and administrators should be required to publish net investment yields and conduct edu-
cational programs.2'
Latin American social security privatization is perceived as a massive business opportunity
for U.S. and other investment managers and insurance companies that may be selected as
administrators of these systems.22 Further, many political leaders and their advisors are in
a rush to move developing economies further away from central planning and at the same
time to solve the looming budgetary crisis social security programs will cause as populations
age. The Chilean model therefore is touted as an appropriate model for both developing
and developed economies to move the world to a global financial renaissance. One of the
areas of the world copying the Chilean model is Eastern Europe.
B. EASTERN EUROPE
Under Communism, pensions were funded by employee contributions to a state system.
Demographics and fiscal problems, as well as a political desire to embrace capitalism, led
to a rethinking of the role of the state providing of social security. Hungary and Poland
have recently made sweeping reforms of their government pension system and opted for
privatization. The new Hungarian law became fully effective on January 1, 1998, and re-
quires participating employees to make mandatory contributions to both the state-managed
fund and a private fund.23 Upon retirement, pensions will come from the state and the
private fund. Private pension funds may be established by employers, labor or management
organizations, professional organizations, the Pension Insurance Administration, or private
15. Seeid. at 436-37.
16. See id. at 424.
17. See id at 427. Mexico, Argentina, and Bolivia have fewer options. See id.
18. See id. at 443-45.
19. See id. at 449.
20. See id. at 451-52.
21. See id.
22. See Mark J. Arend & Natalie Baumer, Setting Sights on Latin America's Coming Pension Boom, 3 GLOBAL
INVESTMENT, Dec. 1996, at 38; Joel Millman & Craig Torres, Mexico to Allow 12 Companies To Offer Pension-
Fund Services, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1997, at A7.
23. Geza Kajta & Terry Hart, Hungary's New Act on Private Pensions and Private Pension Funds, 4 WORLD
SEC. LAw REP. (BNA), Nov. 1998, at 29.
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companies.2 4 There are regulations with regard to fund governance and asset management,
including diversification of investments and prohibitions against undue concentration."
There also are conflict of interest provisions.2 6 The value of securities invested abroad may
not exceed thirty percent of the fund's assets.27
The new Polish law has begun to be implemented in the spring of 1999, and is intended
to reinvigorate a state system that was forecast to go bankrupt within the next two decades.2"
The new system will have three pillars, the first of which closely resembles the current
state-run system.2 9 The second pillar consists of about twenty private pension funds in which
participation is mandatory for taxpayers under thirty years old and optional for tax payers
between thirty and fifty years old.3 0 The third pillar, which is still on the drawing boards,
will encompass voluntary, private plans, including funds organized by companies of five or
more people.3
Although foreign insurance companies and banks have been licensed to manage some
fund assets, only five percent of a fund's assets may be invested abroad.32 A pension fund
may invest up to forty percent of its assets in stocks, but not more than five percent in a
single issuer.33 However, since each fund must maintain a minimum rate of return, it is
anticipated that at least in the early stages most fund assets will be invested in National
Bank of Poland instruments or government bonds.1
4
C. THE UNITED STATES
In his January 1999 State of the Union Address, President Clinton proposed to invest
hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars in the stock market and to create government-
sponsored defined contribution savings plans for the payees. 5 A consensus in Washington
on social security reform that would shift the investment of the social security fund from
government bonds into other securities, including common stocks, was an unexpected shift
from prior positions staked out by conservative and liberal policy makers.3 6 There is a
24. See id.
25. See id. at 30.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Overhauled Pension System Features Privately Managed Funds, 5 WORLD SEC. L. REP. (BNA), Feb. 1999,
at 22.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 23.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Bob Davis et al., More Social Security Or Less? Clinton Plan Faces Lots of Questions, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 20,
1999, at Al.
36. See Mary Jane Auer, Savings-Grace, INsTIrTioNAL INVESTOR, Mar. 1999, at 47. A Federal Advisory Panel
on Social Security, headed by Edward M. Gramlich, that was appointed in 1994 and issued a report in January
1997 was unable to agree on one single plan for dealing with Social Security's financial difficulties, but seven
of thirteen members recommended compulsory private saving through individual investment accounts; Robert
Pear, Panel on Social Security Urges Investing in Stocks, But Is Split Over Methods, N. Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1997, at
Al. See also Jackie Calmes, Social Security Report Opens Debate, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1997, at A2. Initial White
House response was that any plan to put Social Security funds in the stock market raised concerns about risk
no matter whether the government or individuals decide where funds should be invested;Jackie Calmes, Clinton
Panel Cites 'Risk' in Putting Social Security Funds in Stock Market, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1997, at A2. A subsequent
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significant variation, however, in the ideas for social security privatization. Some proposals
would raise the payroll tax and then permit the social security trust fund to invest in com-
mon stocks instead of only government bonds. 7 An alternative would change the present
social security defined benefit system to a defined contribution system." The most free
market version of this concept would permit persons to invest as they choose, although
perhaps only through certified financial institutions. 9 Others contemplate that the private
investment accounts would be allocated by the Social Security Administration into a menu
of five to ten broad market index funds.4 Under any of these plans there are further issues
about whether, upon reaching retirement, accumulated funds should be distributed or con-
verted to annuities.41
Although these proposals are varied, they fall within the paradigms set forth by the
International Labor Organization and the World Bank 2 and the privatizations effected in
the Latin American and Eastern European countries discussed above. 41 Implementation of
any of the proposals, however, would result in the injection of huge capital flows into the
equity markets that would then come under the management of either individuals, govern-
ment approved fund managers, or a government agency."
The driving force behind proposals to privatize social security are the effects that dem-
ographics are likely to have on the government's budget. Because there will be fewer workers
paying taxes relative to the number of retirees drawing benefits once the 76 million baby
boomers leave the work force in coming decades, social security will take in only enough
revenue to pay seventy-five percent of its obligations starting around 2032.4 1 Policy
Federal Advisory Committee headed by Donald Marron unanimously recommended that social security be
supplemented by individual investment accounts. See Richard W. Stevenson, Bipartisan Plan for Rescue of Social
Security Involves Markets and Retirement at 70, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at A17; see also Judd Gregg et al., A
Look at the Future of Social Security, WASH. POST, June 7, 1998, at C03. This idea began to have liberal as well
as conservative backing. See e.g., Gerald F. Seib, Moving Beyond Simply 'Saving' Social Security, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 25, 1998, at A24. Then, President Clinton began to voice interest in investing some of the Social Security
trust fund in the stock market; Christina Duff, Clinton Willing to Consider Investing Some Social Security Funds
in Stocks, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1998, at A4.
37. See EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, Is IT TIME TO REFORM SOCIAL SECURITY? 58 (1998). It can be argued that
allowing the government selectively to invest the trust fund in the private capital markets would amount to
socialization of the economy. See KRZYSZTOF M. OSTASZEWSKI, PRIVATIZING THE SOCIAL SECURITYTRUST FUND?
DON'T LET THE GOVERNMENT INVEST, in THE CATO PROJECT ON SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION, at 1 (Jan.
14, 1997). In any event, it would be difficult to insulate such investment from the political process unless
investment was made into index funds. That could distort the market value of stocks comprising the index and
create other problems because of the large amounts of money involved.
38. See GRAMLICH, supra note 37, at 60.
39. See id. at 62.
40. See id. at 64. This model is similar to that of the Thrift Savings Fund for federal employees. See 5 U.S.C.
8438 (1994).
41. See GRAMLICH, supra note 37, at 62.
42. See supra, notes 9-10.
43. Seesupra, notes 3-37.
44. See GRAMLICH, supra note 37, at 62. It is estimated that there could be 140 million private investment
accounts if social security is privatized. Even if only a small percentage of payroll taxes is put into these accounts
and only a small percentage of these funds are invested, directly or indirectly, in the public securities markets,
billions of dollars would nevertheless be added to these markets. The Social Security Administration estimates
that the size of its fund's portfolio will be $1 trillion (in 1996 dollars) by 2014. See Social Securities?ECONoMIST,
Dec. 14, 1996, at 28.
45. See Richard Stevenson, Squaring Off, at Last, on Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, at 5. See
generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING PRO-
GRAM SOLVENCY 16-20 (GAO/HEHS-98-33,July 1998) [hereinafter GAO Report].
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makers differ dramatically in their reactions to this problem, but virtually all agree that it
is a problem that needs to be addressed. 46 Further, the reluctance of politicians to raise
payroll taxes or reduce entitlements, and the common mantra that common stocks have
better total returns than stocks over time, 4' make it likely that one feature of social security
reform will be to allow workers to invest some social security taxes on their own.
48
D. WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN
Due to declining birth rates and increasing longevity, the share of elderly people in the
G-10 countries has been growing for the past 150 years. It is probable that this trend will
accelerate sharply as the post-World War II baby boom generation begins to reach retire-
ment age.49 It is estimated that in the year 2010, 19.2 percent of the U.S. population over
age fifteen will be over age sixty-five, in contrast to 18.9 percent in the year 1990, and that
in the year 2030, that figure will increase to thirty-three percent of the population.5 0
The prospects for a rapidly aging population in other countries are even more dramatic.
In the year 2010, 32.3 percent of the Japanese population over age fifteen will be over age
sixty-five, and by the year 2030, forty-four percent of the population will be over age sixty-
five."1 By 2025 Japan will have a higher proportion of elderly people than any other country
in the world."' If there is no pension reform before then, either in terms of reducing benefits
or increasing pension fund returns, payroll taxes in Japan will have to rise to thirty-five
percent.
53
The prospects for many European countries are equally grim, especially since Europeans
rely more heavily on government pensions in retirement than do Americans.5 4 In Germany,
France, Italy and the United Kingdom, the percent of the population over age fifteen in
the year 2010 will be 27.7 percent, 25.6 percent, 30.4 percent, and 25.0 percent respectively,
increasing by the year 2030 to 40.4 percent, 40.1 percent, 47.9 percent and 36.5 percent."
Although these figures could change as a result of migration, disease, or a spike in fertility
rates, it is clear that the populations of the world's mature economies are aging and the
46. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RETIREMENT POLICY, CAN AMERICA AFFORD TO RETIRE? THE
RETIREMENT SECURITY CHALLENGE FACING You AND THE NATION (CSIS Jan. 1998); William G. Dauster,
Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 HARV. J. LEGIS. 462 (1996); Martin Feldstein, America's Golden Op-
portunity, ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 1999, at 41; Martin Feldstein, The Case for Privatization, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
July/Aug. 1997, at 24; Richard C. Leone, Stick with Public Pensions, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 1997, at 39;
Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. 131 (1998). See also
GAO Report, supra note 45, at 20-23.
47. See id. GAO Report, supra note 45, at 55-56. See also Gary Burtless & Barry Bosworth, PrivatizingSocial
Security: The Troubling TradeOffi, Brookings Policy Brief No. 14, at 11-13 (Mar. 1997) (visited Sept. 23, 1999)
<http://www.brookings.edu/comm/PolicyBriefs/pbol4l/pbl4.htm>.
48. A recent poll showed 62% of Americans favored this solution and 34% favored investment by the
government of some social security funds in the stock market. See Albert R. Hunt, Gray Power Comes ofAge-
Senior Vote Could Decide 2000 Election, But the Bloc Can be Fickle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1999, at A9, A14.
49. See Group of Ten, The Macroeconomic and Financial Implications of Aging Populations, Apr. 1998, at 2
(visited Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.bis.org/publ/gten04.htm> thereinafter Implications of Aging].
50. See id. at 7.
51. See id.
52. Japan's Debt-ridden Future, ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1996, at 31.
53. See id.
54. See Craig R. Whitney, In Europe, Too, Social Security Isn't So Secure, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 1997, at 4.
55. See Implications of Aging, supra note 49, at 7.
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drain on government pension programs will create a fiscal crisis absent a drastic increase
in payroll taxes or some reform of the pension programs. Countries with pay-as-you-go
plans are especially vulnerable. Further, although private or supplementary pension fund
assets as a percentage of GDP are ninety percent in the Netherlands and sixty percent in
the United States, they are only two to five percent of GDP in France, Germany, and Italy.56
Moreover, the composition of private pension fund assets varies significantly among G- 10
countries. For example, in Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States, pension
funds hold a majority of their assets in equities, whereas in Germany and Italy pension
funds invest primarily in bonds."
An obvious conclusion from the financial consequences of an aging population, in ad-
dition to whatever other reforms might be proposed or adopted, is that savings and in-
vestment should be increased. Further, a move from traditional government mandatory
defined benefit plans to mandatory defined contribution plans, in which everyone has a
personal retirement savings account, has the potential for raising national saving. 58
Various studies and debates concerning reform of state pension systems have begun to
occur in Europe and it is likely that controversies over pension reform will echo the differing
points of view in the United States. Further, it is highly likely that the inexorable challenge
that aging populations will present to government budgetary planners will compel some
shift in pension savings from the public to the private sector. Such a shift presents some
fundamental issues regarding regulation of the new pension architecture, including the
adequacy of securities regulation.59
The primary objectives of securities regulation are to protect investors and ensure that
securities markets are fair, efficient, and transparent. While the reduction of systemic risk
may also be considered an important concern of securities regulators, ensuring against such
risk has traditionally been the concern of bank regulators. 60 If governments begin to en-
courage or even require that their citizens invest retirement savings in the public securities
markets, then those governments will become concerned about investor protection and
market structure issues.
1I. Regulation of Issuers of Securities Financial Disclosure
The United States federal securities laws, as administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), require companies that offer securities to the public to comply with
initial and continuing disclosure obligations. The goals of this disclosure system are to
promote informed decisions by the investing public through full and fair disclosure, which
includes preventing misleading or incomplete financial reporting. High quality accounting
standards are a critical component of this regulatory system.61 Although academic com-
56. See id. at 25.
57. See id. at 27.
58. See id. at 41-42, 44.
59. See id. at 30-33. See ALAN WALKER & TONI MALTBY, AGING EUROPE 59-61 (1997).
60. Michael Taylor, The IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 13 J. INT'L BANKING & FIN.
L. 326, 328 (1998). Nevertheless, healthy clearance and settlement systems and the capital adequacy of securities
firms in the market are matters of concern for securities regulators. Their focus, however, is investor protection
rather than systemic protection. See id.
61. Securities and Exchange Commission, Report On Promoting Global Preeminence ofAmerican SecuritiesMarkets
(visited Oct. 1997) <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/acctgsp.htm> [hereinafter Promoting Global Preemi-
nence].
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mentators have disagreed about the need for, and value of, a mandatory disclosure system,
this system is well established and extensively copied by securities commissions around the
world.62 Nevertheless, substantive disclosure provisions and procedural requirements have
developed in a sufficiently different fashion as to make harmonization and mutual recog-
nition of disclosure regimes difficult.61
As pointed out by a former SEC Commissioner, globalization of the capital markets has
real challenges for regulators.6 Some international cooperative measures are necessary if
domestic regulators are to be able to continue effectively to regulate their own capital
markets.6s However, "the world's securities markets are beset by a maze of contradictory
and incompatible regulatory requirements that often serve no real purpose."66 Further,
nations may legitimately wish to adopt different approaches to some regulatory standardsY.6
The SEC has been well aware of these challenges, especially in the area of financial re-
porting, where comparability is an important value. The SEC's policy, as well as that of
securities regulators in Japan, Canada, and some other countries, has been not to adopt a
mutual recognition approach or eliminate disclosure requirements that assure the avail-
ability of information comparable to that required from domestic registrants.
6
1
Nevertheless, the SEC has been working over the past decade with the International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions (jOSCO) and the International Accounting Standards
Committee (IASC) to develop adequate internationally acceptable disclosure standards.69 In
1990, IOSCO endorsed development or recognition of standards that would facilitate the evo-
lution of a single disclosure document for cross-border offerings and listings.70 In 1994, IOSCO
completed a review of international accounting standards issued by the IASC, and in the next
year IOSCO agreed that a work program prepared byIASC would, upon successful completion,
result in a comprehensive core set of standards.7 These core standards would then be con-
sidered by IOSCO as a basis for preparation of financial statements used in cross-border
offerings and listings.72 Despite the difficulties, work on the core standards has gone forward
62. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70
VA. L. REv. 717 (1984); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection ofInvestors,
70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984); Edmund Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 763 (1995); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 9 J. CoRp. L. 1 (1983).
63. See Merritt Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: "o Should Regulate Whom, 95 U. MICH. L.
REv. 2498 (1997); Manuel Lorenz, EEC Law and Other Problems in Applying the SEC Proposal on Multinational
Offerings to the UK, 21 INr'L LAW. 795 (1987).
64. JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD'S SECURITY MARKETS: ECONOMIC CAUSES
AND REGULATORY CONSEQUENCES OR BEWARE THE UBER-REuLATOR (Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Pro-
gram in Law and Economics, Working Paper Series No. 68 1990).
65. See id. at 21.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. Promoting Global Preeminence, supra note 61, at 6-7.
69. IOSCO is a non-profit association of securities regulatory organizations with approximately 135 mem-
bers. See id. at 7. Its Technical Committee is composed of 16 regulatory agencies, including the SEC, that
regulate the world's largest, more developed and more internationalized markets. The IASC is an independent
private sector body formed in 1973 of all professional accountancy bodies that are members of the International
Federation of Accountants. As of October 1, 1997, it had 129 members from 89 countries. See id. at 8.
70. See id. at 5.
71. See id.
72. See id.
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expeditiously, and at the end of 1998, IASC's project was presented to IOSCO for review."
In the meantime, in September 1998, IOSCO endorsed the Technical Committee's Dis-
closure Standards to Facilitate Cross-Border Offerings and Listings By Multinational Is-
suers.74 These international disclosure standards consist of ten core disclosure items as
follows: identity of directors, senior managers, and advisors; offer statistics and expected
timetable; key information including selected financial data, the reasons for the offer, and
the expected use of proceeds; description of the issuer's business and properties; operating
and financial review and prospects; compensation and shareholdings of directors and senior
managers; major shareholders and related party transactions; financial information; descrip-
tion of the offering including plan of distribution, trading markets, selling shareholders,
dilution, and expenses; and additional information about the issuer's capital, articles of
incorporation and by-laws, material contracts, and applicable taxes.7"
The IOSCO and IASC financial and disclosure standards have been developed primarily
for use in multi-jurisdictional securities offerings. Nevertheless, they should establish a
benchmark for financial disclosure by public companies in emerging as well as mature
market economies. Once governments permit and even encourage a shift of pension fund
savings from government obligations into corporate equities, they should take on the re-
sponsibility of assuring minimum standards of investor protection. The most fundamental
of these protections is financial disclosure requirements. Greater transparency is a critical
factor in sustaining cross-border flows of pension fund investments from industrial coun-
tries into emerging markets.76 The converse should also be the case. The IOSCO disclosure
standards and IASC core financial standards should serve to make issuer disclosure better
and more uniform worldwide.
IV. Corporate Governance
Corporate governance concerns the distribution of power among shareholders, directors
and officers, and the extent to which other constituencies, such as employees and creditors,
have claims on the directors and the firm." In different countries, the claims of these various
constituencies are ordered differently. In the United States and the United Kingdom, where
the financing of enterprise has traditionally been through the public securities markets,
directors' duties are owed to their corporations and the shareholders as a body."8 Generally,
the claims of creditors are paramount only if a company is facing insolvency." The claims
of other constituencies may be taken into account in change of control transactions, but
shareholder interests are difficult for public corporations to disregards °
73. See Denny Beresford, The Race Has Just Begun, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 11, 1999 at 14; Peta Firth,
IASC to Complete Core Standards on Cross-Border Offerings Soon, 30 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1729 (BNA) (1998).
74. International Disclosure Standards, Securities Act Release No. 7637, 64 Fed. Reg. 6261 (Feb. 9, 1999).
75. See id.
76. Implications of Aging, supra note 49, at 32.
77. See Arthur R. Pinto, The United States, in THE LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLICLY
HELD CORPORATIONS 262 (Arthur R. Pinto and Gustavo Visentini eds., 1998) [hereinafter CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE].
78. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (1933); Percival v. Wright, 2 Ch. 421 (1902); Hutton v.
West Cork Ry. Co., 23 Ch. D. 654, 671 (1883).
79. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-10 (1939).
80. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946 (Del. 1985); Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of
the Stakebolder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156 (1993); see also Paul L. Davies, Institutional Investors: A U.K
View, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 129 (1991).
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In Germany and Japan, by contrast, bank creditors and employees have stronger claims
on the board of directors than in the United States, although this does not mean that
shareholder interests are unimportant or neglected.s In Italy and the Netherlands, man-
agers tend to have more autonomy and to be self-perpetuating.8 2 In France, the state has
had a strong influence on corporate governance.83
Nevertheless, globalization of the capital markets and the shift to equity based finance
has been influencing corporate governance so that shareholders are becoming more influ-
ential everywhere. Government policies in France and Italy, for example, have been tilting
in the direction of shareholder rights.14 An important force for greater emphasis on share-
holder rights in corporate governance matters is U.S. institutional investors, who have been
quite active in the United States with regard to corporate governance reform, and who
have begun to export this activism to countries where they become investors.8 5 U.K. pension
finds have joined in this effort to some extent, and the push for protection of minority
shareholders has been felt in Chile, some Asian markets, and elsewhere
s6
Pension privatization is more likely to result in the management of private accounts by
professional money managers than individually self-directed savings accounts. Govern-
ments will have too big a stake in the success of privatization not to limit investor choice
and encourage, if not require, that pension savings be professionally managed. This means
that the ideas that institutional investors have about corporate governance are likely to
become official policy. To some extent this is already happening.
The last decade has seen a flurry of reports by committees in different countries con-
cerning corporate governance, which have a surprising degree of convergence. The United
States undoubtedly heads the list. In the 1970s, the SEC spearheaded corporate governance
reform,8s but debates about corporate governance then moved to the private sector and
focused particularly on the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project.8
Then, such organizations as the Business Roundtable and the National Association of Cor-
porate Directors, and institutional investors, such as Calpers, came out with corporate
governance principles.8 9 Currently, the SEC is back in the corporate governance act, high-
81. See Birk, Germany, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 77, at 64; Hideki Kanda,Japan, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 77, at 115. See also Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and
Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INr'L REV. LAW & EcON. 203 (1994).
82. See Eugenio Ruggerio, Italy, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 77, at 86; Martijn van Empel, The
Netherlands, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 77, at 136.
83. See James A. Fanto, France, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 77, at 7.
84. See id. at 47-48; Ruggerio, supra note 82 at 108-110.
85. See Leslie Wayne, Exporting Shareholder Activism, N.Y.TMES, July 16, 1993, at D1; Michael R. Sesit,
Calpers Voice May Be Heard Outside U.S., WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1996, at C1. See also Thomas Christian Paefgen,
Institutional Investors Ante Portas: A Comparative Analysis of an Emergent Force in Corporate America and Germany,
26 Irr'L LAw. 327, 328-31 (1992); Patrick Speeckaert, Corporate Governance in Europe, 2 FORDHAM FIN., SEC
& TAX L. FORuM 31, 33 (1997).
86. See Paul M. Sherer, Raising Their Voices, WALL ST. J., April 26, 1999, at R15.
87. See Exchange Act Release No. 13482, 42 Fed. Reg. 23901 (Apr. 28, 1977); Exchange Act Release
No. 13901, 42 Fed. Reg. 44860 (Aug. 29, 1977).
88. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (1992). See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance, 48
Bus. LAw. 1271 (1993).
89. Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate Governance (1997), <http://www.brtable.org/document.
cfml/1 1>; REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT ON DIRECTOR PROFESSIONALISM (1996).
See Governance Principles Compared, DIRECTOR's MONTHLY (NACD), Feb. 1998, at 9.
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lighting the role of directors on audit committees.9° Although there are differences in em-
phasis and detail in these initiatives, all of them emphasize the need for and importance of
independent directors as a check on the CEO. The role of such directors with regard to
compensation and audit issues is particularly emphasized.
In Europe, reports recommending corporate governance reform also have been roiling
business interests. In the United Kingdom, the Cadbury Committee published a code of
best practices, 9' which was then followed by the Greenbury and Hampel reports.92 In
France, similar reform proposals have caught the attention of the legal and business com-
munities.93 A report to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) stressed the basic themes of these reports. 94 The OECD Advisory Group set forth
an agenda for corporate governance modernization that addressed defining the mission of
the corporation in the modern economy as generating long-term economic gain to enhance
shareholder (or investor) value; ensuring the adaptability of corporate governance arrange-
ments to allow competition and market forces to work; protecting shareholder rights; en-
abling active investing; aligning the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders; and
recognizing societal interests.95 With regard to protecting shareholder rights, the OECD
report expressed the view that regulatory safeguards should emphasize fairness, transpar-
ency and accountability, and take institutional investors into account.96 Further, there should
be a focus on investor access to performance-related information, shareholder exercise of
voting rights, and the promotion of active and independent (non-executive) members of
boards of directors. 97
Following receipt of this report, the OECD formed an Ad-Hoc Task Force on Corporate
Governance to develop a set of principles that embody the views of member countries on
corporate governance standards and guidelines. 98 The OECD then published principles
covering the rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, including minority
and foreign shareholders, the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and board
responsibilities." With regard to board structure, the OECD principles recommend that
boards consider assigning non-executive board members capable of exercising independent
judgment to tasks where there is a potential for conflicts of interest, such as financial re-
porting, nomination, and executive and board remuneration.1 00
Corporate governance is both cultural and political. In post-industrial economies, or-
ganized labor is weaker than it was formerly and sometimes exerts power as an institutional
90. See SEC To Issue Rule Proposals To Improve Audit Committees "Fairly Quickly," 31 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. 327 (BNA), Mar. 5, 1999.
91. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Dec. 1, 1992).
See Sir Adrian Cadbury, The Code of Best Practice in 1995 and Beyond: Building on the Blueprint, DIRECTOR'S
MONTHLY (NACD), March 1995, at 1.
92. See COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Final Report Jan. 1998). See Report on Corporate Gover-
nance Seeks Minimum Standards, Offers Management Flexibility, INT'L SEC. REG. REPT. (LRP), Aug. 28, 1997, at
1; Whose Company Is It, Anyway? ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 1995, at 59.
93. See Fanto, supra note 83, at n.3.
94. See BUSINESS SECTOR ADVISORY GROUP ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESSAND
ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN GLOBAL MARKETS: A REPORT TO THE OECD (Apr. 2, 1998).
95. See id. at 17-18.
96. See id. at 17.
97. See id.
98. OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, SG/CG (99) 5, Apr. 16, 1999, at 3.
99. See id. at 6-11.
100. Seeid. at 10.
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shareholder rather than as a union.'0 ' As post-industrial societies age, there will be further
shifts in the policies exerted upon corporations. In the past, governments and labor have
been most interested in the capability of corporations as employers of large numbers of
people. In the future, if government pensions are fully or partially privatized, governments
and labor will become more interested in corporate profitability and investment returns.
V. Securities Market Structure and Regulation
A. REGULATION OF ExcHANGES AND TRADING TRANSPARENCY
The transaction costs of privatized pension arrangements are a significant issue. These
costs include not only management fees, but also the costs of trading securities. Generally
a broker-dealer has a duty to seek to obtain best execution for a customer's order, which is
understood to mean that a broker-dealer must obtain the most favorable terms available
under the circumstances for a customer's transaction. 02 In today's markets, however, it is
frequently difficult to measure best execution. This is because trading markets have become
complicated and fragmented.
Until recently, stock exchanges were floor-based membership organizations that traded
primarily domestic securities. Today, however, secondary securities market trading is a
global business and there is competition among exchanges for listings.1°s Further, stock
exchanges around the world, with the notable exception of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), have become electronic markets and no longer have floors.- ° The problems of
regulating such cyber-markets have only begun to be addressed. Further, the orientation
of regulators in different countries concerning trading transparency differs.
The SEC mandate regarding securities market structure is driven by the national market
system mandate added to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) in 1975.0'
The critical features of such a system according to the statute are: economically efficient
executions; fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and
between exchange and non-exchange markets; the availability to brokers, dealers, and in-
vestors of information regarding quotes and trades; the practicality of best execution; and
the opportunity for investors' orders to be operated without the participation of a dealer.1"6
In addition, the statute advocates market linkages.' °7 The SEC has long been concerned
about fragmented and hidden markets.0 " Accordingly, the SEC has implemented the na-
101. The Teamsters Union, for example, is an active institutional shareholder. State pension funds such as
Calpers and the New York City Teachers have a more activist agenda than, for example, the General Motors
Pension Fund. See Proposals on Director Independence Get Record Proxy Votes, DIRECTOR'S ALERT,June 1998, at 2;
AFL-CIO Steps up Board Power Struggle, supra at 1.
102. See SEC DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, MARKET 2000, AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EotUrv
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS Jan. 1994), at V-1 [hereinafter MARKET 2000]. See infra notes 137-38.
103. See Good-bye to All That, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1999, at 67.
104. See Suzanne McGee, Trading Places, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1999, at R42.
105. The national market system responsibilities given to the SEC were added to the Exchange Act in 1975
by Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975), (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. (1994)).
106. See Exchange Act §1 lA(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a) (1994).
107. This led to the development of the ITS System in the early 1980s. See MARKET 2000, supra note 102,
at 1-7, App. I.
108. Development of a National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 14416, 43 Fed. Reg. 4354
(1978).
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tional market system by the establishment of a consolidated tape, composite quotation and
last sale reporting system, 10 9 and the development of integrated clearing and settlement
rules."1° Anticompetitive trading rules and practices by exchanges have been attacked if not
completely eliminated.' The SEC also has attempted to foster fair competition and best
execution through the imposition of order execution rules.'
In Europe, debates about market structure have centered on the adoption of the Invest-
ment Services Directive (ISD) and its implementation."' Among other things, the ISD
establishes minimum standards for the regulation of stock exchanges. It does so through its
provisions relating to "regulated markets." These include a requirement for listings to be
conducted in accordance with the listing directive, a reporting requirement to a competent
authority for transactions, whether effected on or off a regulated market, transparency
requirements, an optimal concentration requirement, and provision for cooperation among
the regulated markets. Due to the inability of the European stock exchanges and govern-
ments to agree to a market structure model, the ISD almost failed approval and required
so much flexibility of implementation to gain approval that it does not provide a standard
for pan-European exchange trading. In large part, these disagreements were the product
of competition between SEAQ International in London and continental exchanges for
trading volume in non-U.K. stocks, but the continental exchanges have reclaimed some of
this trading volume, and the advent of remote membership and electronic trading may
make this rivalry moot."1
4
In addition to its failure to come to grips with transparency requirements, the ISD does
not provide a comprehensive approach to many issues that arise in the regulation of markets.
Some issues not addressed are the need for an exchange to be licensed, to have adequate
financial resources, to run proper markets, to have adequate monitoring and enforcement,
to provide satisfactory arrangement for clearance and settlement, and to cooperate with
regulators.'" In addition, the ISD does not address the very difficult question of when a
securities firm or facility should be required to register as a "regulated market.""6
109. Exchange Act, Rules 11Acl-I, 1lAcl-2, 11 C.F.R. § 240.11A(c)(1-1), 11A(c)(1-2) (1998).
110. Exchange Act, § 17A, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (1994). See Regulation of Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act
Release No. 16900, 45 Fed. Reg. 1920 (June 17, 1980).
111. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES TRADING-SEC ACTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS NA-
TIONAL MARKET SYSTEM ISSUES (GAO/GGD-90-52) (Mar. 1990); Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding the NASD and the Nasdaq Market, Exchange Act Release
No. 37542, 62 SEC Doc. 1385 (Aug. 8, 1996).
112. Exchange Act, Rules lAcl-1, Rule llAcl-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1lAcl-1, 4 (1998).
113. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Services in the Securities Field, 1989 OJ.
(C 43) 7.
114. See Ailsa Roell, Competition Among European Exchanges: Recent Developments, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES
MARKETS, THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND 213-18 (Guido Ferrarini ed., 1998) [hereinafter
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS]. See also A New Broom for Europe's Capital Markets, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 1994,
at 75.
115. See Andrew Whittaker, A European Law for Regulated Markets? Some Personal Views, in EUROPEAN SE-
CURITIES MARKETS, supra note 114, at 269, 270-71.
116. See and compare Fabrice Demarigny, A European Directive for Regulated Markets? A French Reaction, in
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 114, at 275, 280-82 with RUBEN LEE, WHAT IS AN ExCHANGE? THE
AtrOMATION, MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 295-316 (1998) [hereinafter WHAT Is
AN ExCHANGE?].
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In the United States, these issues have been addressed in the context of the regulation of
alternative trading systems (ATSs). In general, the SEC has been concerned about the lack
of transparency of hidden or fragmented markets created by institutional investors in cyber-
space. However, regulation of ATSs has focused on defining an "exchange." Rulemaking to
this end began with a Concept Release proposing a new regulatory regime that would either
require ATSs to register with the SEC as exchanges or impose new obligations that would
permit ATSs to continue to be regulated as broker-dealers, but would require them to
comply with rules designed to improve their transparency and surveillance, as well as their
systems capacity, integrity, and security."7
The SEC asserted that ATSs were handling almost twenty percent of orders in over-the-
counter stocks and four percent of orders in NYSE listed securities and, therefore, they
needed to be better integrated into the national market system." 8 The particular concerns
highlighted by the Concept Release as a justification for increased regulation of ATSs were
market access and fairness, market transparency and coordination, market surveillance and
market stability, and systemic risks." 9 In general, comments opposed the "exchange-lite"
concept and suggested that ATSs be permitted to remain registered as broker-dealers as
they have been historically. The SEC then proposed rules and requested comment on a
framework that would allow ATSs to choose to be a market participant and register as a
broker-dealer, or to be a separate market and register as an exchange2 °1 The thrust of these
proposals was to integrate ATSs into the national market system. 2' Although the proposals
were controversial and generated a fair amount of negative comment, the SEC adopted its
proposed framework with only minor modifications.
The SEC's objective of bringing ATSs into the national market system has been accom-
plished by a new and expanded definition of the term "exchange" that captures most ATSs,
and a rule exempting ATSs from exchange registration if they register pursuant to Regu-
lation ATS and undertake certain new obligations as to the transparency of their quotes
and trades, fair access and systems capacity. The SEC's new rule'22 interprets the term
"exchange" to include "any organization, association or group of persons that: (1) brings
together the orders of multiple buyers and sellers; and (2) uses established non-discretionary
methods (whether by providing a trading facility or by setting rules) under which such
orders interact with each other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders agree to
the terms of a trade." "3 The SEC justified its revised interpretation by asserting that al-
though traditional exchanges still provide liquidity through two-sided quotations and raise
an expectation of liquidity at the quoted price, this is no longer the essential characteristic
of a securities market. Today's technology enables market participants to tap simultaneous
and multiple sources of liquidity from remote locations.24 Europe has not been as troubled
117. Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 38672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30485 (May 23, 1997) [here-
inafter Concept Release].
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Regulation ATS, Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release
No. 39884, 63 Fed. Reg. 23504 (Apr. 17, 1998).
121. See id.
122. Exchange Act, Rule 3b-16, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16 (1999).
123. See id.
124. See id. at 70899.
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as the United States by the proliferation of ATSs because securities regulators generally
leave market structure issues to exchanges for their self-regulation. An argument can be
made that market structure issues should be left to the competition of the market because
competition will assure that pricing mechanisms are sound and fair.' Therefore, the only
market structure issues that should be the concern of securities regulators are the suppres-
sion of manipulation and insider trading.
12 6
Nevertheless, the ability of investors in one country to access electronic exchanges in
other countries raises serious issues about how secondary securities marketplaces should be
regulated and by whom. Although the SEC has adopted new rules for the regulation of
ATSs in the United States, it has been unable thus far to propose or adopt regulations
pertaining to foreign stock exchanges wishing to provide trading screens to U.S. investors.,'
If social security savings begin to flow into the equity markets and begin to be invested
across national borders in cyber-space, these issues will have to be addressed. Should Chil-
ean or Hungarian trust funds, to the extent they can invest internationally, be limited to
doing so on "regulated" exchanges or markets? Similarly, if the United States or Germany
privatize social security, will their governments allow pension fund assets to be invested in
unregulated markets abroad?
Securities regulators have begun to focus on the need to address market structure issues
because of the impact of technology and globalization on domestic exchanges. At its 1996
meeting, the Council of Securities Regulators of the Americas (COSRA) issued agreed upon
Principles of Market Structure to provide guidance to regulators.12s Participants at the
COSRA meeting acknowledged that in light of the diversity and evolving nature of market
structures, it was impossible to imagine a single structure or set of rules well suited for all
countries and markets.129 Nevertheless, regulators were exhorted to concentrate their efforts
on pursuing fundamental goals, such as investor protection, full disclosure, fair, orderly,
and efficient markets, and the facilitation of venture capital.' 3 It was agreed that regulators
could lessen the effects of fragmentation across multiple markets and preserve the benefits
of competition by promoting best execution, information transparency, and adequate mech-
anisms for the free flow of information and access to bids and offers simultaneously quoted
in different markets.131
If social security is privatized, more efficient and better executions of secondary market
transactions will have to become a matter of government policy. Whether retirement sav-
ings are invested directly by individuals or by collective funds, execution costs will adversely
125. WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE?, supra note 116, at 260-61, 264-65.
126. See id. at 308-09.
127. In its Concept Release, supra note 117, at 30521-30, the SEC addressed this issue, but then did not
follow up with any rule proposals. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has been grappling
with the same problem. See CFTC Withdraws Controversial Proposal on E-Access by Foreign Markets in U.S., 106
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), June 3, 1999, at A-30; Comparability, Competitive Concerns Frame Debate
Over Foreign Terminals in U.S., 31 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 16 (BNA), Apr. 23, 1999, at 540.
128. Communique of the Council of Securities Regulators of the Americas, Fifth Annual Meeting, June 20-
21, 1996, in THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1997, (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-980, Vol. M,
at 840, 853 1997). COSRA's membership includes regulators from over 25 countries in North, Central and
South America and the Caribbean.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 854.
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affect the return earned on these savings. While some advocates of privatization may argue
that equity investment returns are superior to returns on government bonds, these returns
are subject to transaction costs. Although these costs may be minimal in relation to other
costs of administering a privatized social security system, they could become large enough
in the aggregate to attract the attention of government regulators.
The International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV) has recognized that exchanges
may offer different degrees of transparency depending upon their resolution of the balance
between transparency and liquidity.'32 Nevertheless, the FIBV also recognizes that market
transparency is an important element of fairness and, therefore, transactions should be
reported promptly, and in detail, as to price and volume to the exchange. 1- The FIBV also
has defined the duty of best execution for its members. This involves executing agency
orders promptly, and at the best available price for market orders, and charging an agreed-
upon, fully disclosed commission.3 4 This also involves executing principal orders at a price
reasonably related to the market price. 35
The sheer enormity of the funds that would flow into the equity markets under social
security privatization would likely change those markets in unpredictable ways. Whether
social security funds are invested through index funds, other types of funds, or through
individualized decision making, governments would have a much greater stake in the con-
tinued buoyancy of the stock markets than they have today. At the same time, governments
would have to be concerned about the efficiency and fairness of those markets.
VI. Continuous Disclosure, Insider Trading,
and Manipulation
The prevention and suppression of fraud is a major objective of any securities regulator.
If investors do not have confidence that the public securities markets are fair and honest,
they will be disinclined to trade in those markets. The preamble to the Exchange Act
provides that it is an "Act to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-
the-counter markets" to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and
markets.16 The necessity for SEC regulation, as spelled out in section 2 of the Exchange
Act, refers to the national public interest in securities transactions conducted upon public
securities markets, the importance of prices established in such transactions, and the need
to secure the maintenance of fair and honest securities markets.' 37
The SEC's scheme of mandated public disclosure concerning the business affairs and
financial condition of public companies is carried out not only through the registration
provisions of the Securities Act, applied when companies sell their securities to the public,
but also through the continuous reporting obligations of the Exchange Act. Disclosure
requirements are established by the SEC pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act) 38 and the Exchange Act. 139 The Securities Act is primarily concerned with initial dis-
132. Generally Accepted Principles of Securities Business Conduct (1992), in FIBV ANNUAL REPoRr 49 (1997)
[hereinafter FIBV Principles].
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. Exchange Act, pmbl., 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
138. See id. §§ 77a et seq. (1994).
139. See id. §§ 78a et seq. (1994).
WINTER 2000
972 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
tributions of securities. It requires that securities issuances either be registered with the
SEC prior to sale or that an appropriate exemption from registration exists.14' The regis-
tration statement must contain specified information about the security, the issuer, and the
underwriter.41
The Exchange Act is primarily concerned with post-distribution trading in securities. It
requires publicly held companies to file annual and periodic reports with the SEC, including
audited annual financial statements. 42 Under the SEC's integrated disclosure regulations,
material in Exchange Act reports can be incorporated by reference in Securities Act reg-
istration statements. 41 From 1934 until 1964, when section 12(g) was added to the Ex-
change Act,'" only companies listed on national securities exchanges were subject to the
registration provisions of the Exchange Act. Under section 12(g), all publicly traded com-
panies of a certain size became subject to the reporting provisions of the Exchange Act. 45
Today, any corporation with 500 shareholders and $10 million in assets must register its
securities under section 12(g)14 and, therefore, must file an annual report with the SEC
containing audited financial information within ninety days of the company's year-end.' 4'
Information in the annual report, including the year-end financial statements, must be sent
to shareholders in order to solicit proxies for the corporation's annual meeting.' 48 Exchange
Act reporting companies also must file unaudited quarterly earnings reports. 49
The Exchange Act's regime for corporate disclosure is frequently referred to as a contin-
uous disclosure system. However, corporations are not, in fact, required to make continuous
disclosure of material information, although in addition to the annual and quarterly reports
that the Exchange Act requires companies to file, they are also required to report certain
material events on Form 8-K. The events that trigger a mandatory filing are limited to:
changes in control; the acquisition or disposition of significant assets not in the ordinary
course of business; bankruptcy or receivership; a change of accountants; resignation of
directors; and a change in fiscal years.55 These are watershed events in the life of a cor-
poration, not events of routine materiality that nevertheless can move stock prices signifi-
cantly.'5'
Part of the continuous disclosure regime, therefore, is stock exchange policies that affir-
matively require the continuous disclosure of material information. For example, the New
York Stock Exchange Listing Manual provides that a listed company "is expected to release
quickly to the public any news or information which might reasonably be expected to
materially affect the market for its securities."'52 The Securities Act Amendments of 1964,
140. See id. § 77e (1994).
141. See id. § 7 7g (19 9 4).
142. See id. §§ 781, 78m (1994).
143. See Exchange Act Release No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11380 (Mar. 3, 1982).
144. Securities Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 556-577 (1964).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 24 0 .12 (g)-l (1994).
146. See id.
147. See Form 10-K, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,101-07 (Apr. 22, 1998).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994).
149. Form 10-Q, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,031-35 (Sept. 17, 1997).
150. Form 8-K, Items 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 31001-04, at 21,992-96 (Sept. 13, 1996).
151. Although a public corporation may report on Form 8-K any other event the company "deems of
importance to securities holders," such reporting of events of every day materiality is voluntary, not mandatory.
Form 8-K, Item 5, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §§ 31,0001-04, at 21,995 (Sept. 13, 1996).
152. See id.
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imposing continuous reporting on all public companies, was patterned after the disclosure
obligations in such stock exchange listing requirements.' Congress believed that a system
of mandated public disclosure under federal law was necessary to reinforce the essentially
voluntary obligations set forth in exchange listing agreements.14 By 1964, Congress felt
that all public companies, not only listed issuers, should be required to provide shareholders
with current information after going public.'
Due to the gaps that exist in the continuous disclosure system, the SEC and the courts
also have developed the ban against trading on inside information by public companies,
their officers and directors, and their advisors and tippees.Y16 This doctrine was developed
pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act' and Rule 10b-518 thereunder, a catchall
antifraud provision generally used by the SEC to police the public securities markets. These
provisions also are the basis for civil liability under the Exchange Act in actions for fraud
against issuers, financial intermediaries, and individuals. 15 9
In addition to providing for a continuous disclosure system for public companies and
banning trading on inside information, the Exchange Act outlaws the manipulation of se-
curities prices.16 Other provisions of the Exchange Act, giving the SEC authority with
respect to the regulation of short selling,' 6' options trading,162 and securities margins, 163 are
related to the statute's overall objectives of making the public securities markets fair and
efficient and free from inequitable practices and undue speculation. Globalized trading of
derivatives has undercut the SEC's powers in these matters to a significant extent, and
created the kind of market volatility that threatens the security markets periodically.-6
Countries other than the United States, even those with mature and sophisticated finan-
cial markets, do not have such an elaborate regulatory system mandating continuous dis-
closure and outlawing manipulation of securities prices. The European Union has directives
that establish disclosure standards for public offerings and listings of securities, 165 including
the Interim Reports Directive that imposes an ongoing requirement on stock exchange
153. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION, VOL. 1, 95TH CONG., IST SESS. 574 (Comm. Print 1977).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 601-605.
156. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
158. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
159. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). Rule lOb-5 has given rise to great
quantities of cases and commentaries too numerous to cite.
160. Exchange Act § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1994).
161. Exchange Act § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (1994).
162. Exchange Act § 9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1994).
163. Exchange Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1994).
164. The October 1987 stock market crash was exacerbated by the interaction of equity and futures markets.
See Lewis Solomon & Howard Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public Policy Analysis, 57 FOROHAM L.
REv. 191 (1988). In the summer of 1998, markets all over the world were shaken by the threatened collapse of
an unregulated hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management. See Charles Gasparino & Michael Schroeder,
Regulators Face Calls on Scrutiny of Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1998, at AI8; Michael Siconolfi et al.,
How the Salesmanship and Brainpower Failed at Long-Term Capital, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at Al.
165. See Admissions Directive, Council Directive 80/390, 1980 OJ. (L 100) 1, amended by Council Directive
82/148, 1982 OJ. (L 62) 22, and Council Directive 1990 OJ. (L 112) 24, available in <http://europa.eu.int/
-lex/enlif/dat/1980/enLO390.html>.
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listed companies to publish semi-annual profit and loss reports and developments of sig-
nificance to investors.' 66 The ISD is the only directive relating to trading in the secondary
markets and it does not address market manipulation. The new Financial Services Authority
(FSA) in the United Kingdom intends to promulgate a Code of Market Conduct that will
prohibit market manipulation."6 Further, the draft Code proposes a concept of relevant
information that should be made available to all users on an essentially equal basis. 68
The prohibition against trading on inside information, however, is a concept that has
gained widespread acceptance. In the European Union, an Insider Trading Directive' 69 was
adopted in order to harmonize insider-trading laws, which previously were not uniform
throughout Europe.7 0 All of the EU countries have now implemented this directive, the
last of which to do so being Germany in 1994."'1 In addition, the Council of Europe in
1990 adopted a convention on Insider Trading, condemning it and committing signatories
to a regime of mutual assistance in combating it."'
In September 1998, IOSCO issued Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation"'
that included five (out of thirty) principles for secondary market trading. The first two were
that the establishment of trading systems, including exchanges, should be subject to regu-
latory authority and oversight, and to ongoing supervision, to ensure that the integrity of
trading is maintained through fair and equitable rules. In addition, IOSCO recommended
that regulation should promote trading transparency, and detect and deter manipulation
and other unfair trading practices. 74
The FIBV has been more pointed and more specific regarding anti-manipulation stan-
dards. The FIBV believes that its members should refrain from any action that would hinder
or disrupt the fair and orderly functioning of the market and give consideration to outlawing
specific manipulative conduct, such as trades that involve no change of beneficial ownership
or give a false appearance of activity."'
Maintaining sound secondary trading markets are just as important in protecting inves-
tors and facilitating capital formation as the establishment of a mandatory disclosure system
166. Council Directive 82/121, 1982 O.J. (L 48) 26, available in <http://europa.eu.int/-lex/en/lif/dat/
1982/en_382LO121.html>.
167. FSA, MARKET ABUSE, Pt. 2, at 8-11 (1998).
168. Seeid. at Pt. 1, 19-20.
169. Council Directive 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30, available in <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/
data/1989/en_389L0592.html>.
170. France was the first European country to ban insider trading in 1967. Amy E. Stutz, Note, A New Look
at the European Economic Community Directive on Insider Trading, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 164-65 (1990).
When the EU Insider Trading Directive was passed, insider trading was a criminal offense in the United
Kingdom, see id., but not violative of any statute in Germany. See Urusula C. Pfeil, Comment, Finanzplatz
Deutscbland: Germany Enacts Insider Trading Legislation, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 137, 137 (1996).
171. The EU Insider Trading Directive required member States to adopt insider trading laws byJune 1992.
See Stephen J. Leacock, In Search of a Giant Leap: Curtailing Insider Trading in International Securities Markets
By the Refbrm of Insider Trading Laws Under European Union Council Directive 89/592, 3 TULsA J. Coup. & Irr'L
L. 51, 55 (1995). When Germany had not responded, the European Commission instituted infringement
proceedings in October 1992. The insider law was finally passed on July 8, 1994. See id. at 62-63.
172. Convention on Insider Trading, Apr. 20, 1989, Council of Europe, 29 I.L.M. 309 (1990).
173. See Forward and Executive Summary, in THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1999 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Hand-
book Series No. B-1104, Vol. 1, at 285, 1999).
174. See id. at 287-88. The remaining principles dealt with regulation of large exposures and clearance and
settlement systems. See id.
175. FIBV Principles, supra note 132.
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for primary offerings of securities. Before a state privatizes social security, it is essential that
it examines the functioning and regulation of domestic trading markets and the markets in
other jurisdictions where investment will be permitted to assure that pension savings will
not be dissipated in market manipulations or fraud. 7 6 In transition economies where capi-
talism and private law are immature and trading markets are illiquid, it may be difficult to
prevent the kind of volatility and speculation that destroys investor savings and confi-
dence.'77 Realistically, however, the state is the social welfare insurer of last resort. Further,
the capital provided by privatized pension funds can assist a transition economy in raising
the standard of living in the country. It, therefore, behooves privatizers to insist upon rig-
orous securities regulation.
Such regulation should include provisions mandating annual and periodic disclosure by pub-
lic companies in addition to any disclosure requirements pertaining to offerings. Further, ad-
ministration and enforcement of insider trading prohibitions should emphasize that prompt
disclosure of material events by issuers can prevent violations. Also, anti-manipulation pro-
visions in addition to those involving insider trading need to be formulated and enforced.
IOSCO and other international organizations have been and can continue to be helpful in
formulating international standards in this area.
VII. Regulation of Intermediaries
Although social security privatization sometimes is debated in the United States as if this
were a unique and novel idea, the United States already has a mixed pension system. In
addition to government-provided pensions commonly known as social security, there are
employer provided pensions and individual pensions. Employer pensions may be provided
by governmental or private-sector employers, and they may be defined benefit plans or
defined contribution plans. The individual plans may be investment retirement accounts or
some other type of tax-advantaged plans. 78
There are two kinds of risk to which all of these plans are subject: investment risk (in
that the fund manager may make investments that decline in value) and credit risk (in that
the trustee holding the assets of the pension plan may become insolvent). There are a
number of models of intermediary regulation that are designed to mitigate against these
risks. One model can be found in the Investment Company Act of 1940,1'9 an important
model because a significant proportion of retirement savings is invested in such pooled-
investment vehicles. Further, the privatized pension plans of Chile and other countries
employ similar funds in their regulatory schemes.8 0
Investment companies are heavily regulated by the SEC. They must have independent
176. The pension mis-selling scandal in the United Kingdom is an example of the perils of privatization.
See Steve Stecklow & Sara Calian, Social Security Switch in U.K is Disastrous; A Caution to the U.S.?, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 10, 1998, at Al.
177. See Lee Hockstader, Albanian Dreamt Shatter in Pyramid Scbeme's Fall, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1997, at
A29; Eastern Europe's Wild Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at A18.
178. See generally SEC Staff Report, Protecting Investors: A Half Century of Investment Company Regu-
lation, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1504, at 119-36 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter Protecting Investors].
179. 15 U.S.C. § 80a etseq (1998).
180. See Pt. nl(A)-(B), supra, at 3-2 5. Social security privatization in the United States is similarly likely to
involve individual choice among a menu of funds. See Greg Hitt & Bob Davis, Archer's Social Security Proposal
Faces Opposition From Conservatives, Liberals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1999, at A28.
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directors on their board"'1 who must approve any advisory contacts with an investment
advisor. 2 Various types of conflict of interest transactions are prohibited or regulated" s3
and capital structures are constrained.' s4 In addition, investment companies are subject to
the registration requirements of the Securities Act and the annual reporting requirements
of the Exchange Act. s5 Nevertheless, as long as the investment policies of an investment
company are disclosed and maintained, there are no restrictions on what securities they can
buy or sell or the velocity of their trading.
In the case of employee benefit plan assets, a different type of regulatory model is found in
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),1 6 the primary law governing
the activities of all retirement plans and their sponsors. ERISA subjects plan sponsors to fi-
duciary duties with regard to the investment of plan assets, but these duties differ if the plans
are defined contribution or defined benefit plans. The plan fiduciaries of defined benefit plans
have duties to choose prudently and monitor the plans' investments. 8 7 Many defined contri-
bution plans, however, place the responsibility on employee-participants to direct the invest-
ment of their individual accounts. Investment risk thus falls on the employee.' Fiduciaries of
a participant-directed defined contribution plan must choose investments prudently and moni-
tor investment options available to participants, but the plan participants choose suitable in-
vestments from the options available.' 9
ERISA mandates fiduciary responsibility for investment managers, trustees, or any other
person with control over a pension plan or its assets. 190 However, the managers used by
private pension funds are not regulated by any one regulator. A large number of plans are
managed by insurance companies regulated by state insurance commissioners.' 91 Most of
the remaining private pension funds are managed by banks, and the federal and state bank-
ing laws provide guidelines for their investment management. 92 Funds managed by broker-
dealers or by mutual funds are not subject to investment guidelines. 93
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures defined pension plans
against employer insolvency.9 4 An employee in a participant-directed defined contribution
plan has no such PBGC safety net. However, if the plan assets are maintained at a broker-
dealer or bank, other government insurance would give the plan some protection against
intermediary insolvency. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures the
deposits of banks and savings associations and provides insurance not to exceed $100,000
for each depositor at every insured depositary institution. 9 Customers of brokerage firms
181. The membership of a board of directors of an SEC registered investment company may not include
more than 60% of members who are "interested persons" of the investment company. Investment Company
Act, § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1994). The SEC staff believes that the number of independent investors
should be increased to a majority. Protecting Investors, supra note 178, at 253-54.
182. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1994).
183. See, e.g., id. §§ 15, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15 and 17 (1994).
184. See id. § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1994).
185. See id. § 24(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24 (1994).
186. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
187. Protecting Investors, supra note 178, at 120.
188. Seeid. at 120.
189. See id.
190. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002 (21)(A), 1104(A) (1998).
191. WILLIAM A. LoVErr, BANKING ANO FINANCIAL INSTITtrIONs LAw 408-09 (1997).
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Protecting Investors, supra note 178, at 120.
195. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811(a), 1813(a)(2), 182 1(a)(1)(B) and (C) (1994).
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also enjoy federal deposit insurance. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(SIPC), a federal insurer similar to the FDIC, is authorized to pay up to $500,000, but not
more than $100,000 for a cash claim, to satisfy the net equity claims of customers. 9 6
If plan assets are maintained at a mutual fund, FDIC or SIPC insurance also covers such
assets because SEC registered investment companies are required to maintain their secu-
rities at banks or broker-dealers.191 Employee benefit plans may also be managed by insur-
ance companies subject to state regulation where plan assets are protected by state insurance
guaranty funds. 19s
To protect the FDIC and SIPC insurance funds, there are capital adequacy rules that
cover banks and broker-dealers. Risk-based capital adequacy rules promulgated by the
FDIC'9 are designed to protect depositors and prevent bank insolvencies. The SEC im-
poses capital adequacy rules on broker-dealers.2°0 These regulations differ in that bank
regulators calculate capital adequacy on a going concern basis, and securities regulators
calculate capital on a liquidation basis.1 Capital standards for insurance companies are
established by state regulators to insure long-term viability and to protect policy holders,
and capital is calculated on a going concern basis. 20 2 Open-end investment companies are
regulated to assure that their shares are redeemable on a daily basis, but there is no federal
insurance program designed to pay off mutual fund shareholders if that proves impossible.
The purpose of this analysis is not to point out the complicated and inconsistent nature
of the safety net for pension assets in the United States, but to explain that there is a safety
net that protects private sector plan assets against intermediary insolvency. The dangers of
failing to provide such a safety net were dramatically illustrated in the United Kingdom
when Robert Maxwell stole £420 million from the pension schemes under his control. °3
This led to an investigation by the Pension Law Review Committee and the adoption of
legislation to protect retirement savings against such problems.2 4
The regulation of investment decision-making to ward off pension losses due to invest-
ment risk exists to some extent in the United States, but such regulation is difficult, and as
the foregoing suggests, it does not apply to self-directed pension plans. Moreover, as the
next part will argue, regulation of investment decision-making by pension plan trustees in
the United States and elsewhere often does not accord with modern portfolio theories
regarding prudent investment. Further, it frequently outlaws or at least inhibits cross-border
capital flows.
VIII. Prudent Investment and Cross-Border Flows
The prudent investor rule is a legal standard prescribed for investment trustees and other
financial fiduciaries. The traditional prudent man rule as set forth in the Second Restate-
196. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (1994).
197. Invesunent Company Act, § 17(0, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(f) (1994).
198. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RIsK-BASED CAPITAL: REGULATORY AND INDUSTRY APPROACHES TO
CAPITAL AND RISK 33, 44, 64-67 (GAO/GGD-98-153 July 1998) [hereinafter Risk-Based Capital]. See also
Francine L. Semaya & Lenore S. Marema, State Insurer Insolvency System in Need of Repair, NAT'L L. J.,
Aug. 26, 1996, at C4.
199. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 327 (1998).
200. Exchange Act, Rule 15c3-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (1998) (customer protection-reserves and custody
of service).
201. Risk-Based Capital, supra note 198, at 5, 42-43, 54-58.
202. See id. at 64-67.
203. See Richard Nobles, Legislation Pensions Act 1995, 59 MOD. L. REV. 241 (1996).
204. See id.
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ment required a trustee to make such investments and only such investments as a prudent
man would make of his own property having in mind the preservation of the estate.05 As
narrowly interpreted by the courts, this rule discouraged trustees from making many types
of investments and diversifying assets. 06 The core of the prudent man standard was the
distinction between prudence and speculation.0 7 This narrow conception of safety and risk
was not in accord with modern portfolio theory which posits that the risk of owning any
particular asset is best measured in terms of the risk that the asset adds to a well-diversified
portfolio of assets. 0 a Nevertheless, traditional trust law supplemented the duty of prudence
with a duty to distribute the risk of loss through reasonable diversification. Thus, trust
assets were required to be both diversified and individually prudent.? 9
In 1990, the Third Restatement replaced the prudent man rule with a new prudent
investor rule to be applied to investments not in isolation, but in the context of the trust
portfolio and as part of an overall investment strategy. 10 This endorses the mitigation of
the unique risk of the asset by offsetting that risk against the unique risk of another asset
through diversification.2" The new Uniform Prudent Investor Act' 2 similarly embraces
modern portfolio theory.213
ERISA was enacted in 1974 and imposed the standard of the Second Restatement on
trustees. 14 This required them to invest prudently and to diversify. The only negative
prohibitions on portfolio selection in ERISA are that no more than ten percent of plan
assets may consist of employers' securities or real property."' However, as interpreted by
the courts, an ERISA fiduciary has no obligation to diversify individually prudent invest-
ments even where associated risks could be reduced through diversification.' 6 This appli-
cation of the ERISA prudence standard has been criticized and it has been suggested that
ERISA!s investment rules should adopt the principles that fiduciaries must make all reason-
able efforts to eliminate diversifiable risks.217
In the case of participant-directed defined contribution plans, the ERISA prudence rule
may become subsumed by broker suitability restrictions. 1s A good argument can be made
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) (1959).
206. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
52, 53 (1987).
207. See id. at 66.
208. See id. at 54; see also Deborah M. Weiss, The Regulation of Funded Social Security, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 993,
995-96 (1998).
209. Deborah M. Weiss & Marc A. Sgaraglino, Prudent RisksforAnxious Workers, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 1175,
1186 (1996).
210. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1990).
211. Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 209, at 1188-90.
212. Unif. Prudent Investor Act, 7B U.L.A. 18 (Supp. 1997).
213. See John Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 1996 IowA L.
REv. 641, 669 (1996).
214. ERISA, § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(C). The prudent man or prudent investor rule is a
common law standard. Congress intended to federalize trust law in ERISA, but not to prevent its evolution.
See Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 209, at 1198.
215. ERISA, supra note 214, § 407(a)(2).
216. Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 209, at 1192.
217. See id. at 1199. Professor Weiss also has recommended that privatized social security accounts be
actively managed by investment professionals. See id. at 1015.
218. In some plans, participants may choose between a menu of mutual funds. It may also be possible for
the participant to choose to maintain an account at a broker-dealer and personally select investments. See
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that the suitability doctrine should be informed by modem portfolio theory.2I9 Further,
modem portfolio theory has been endorsed by many commentators in academia, in practice,
and in government, and is utilized in pension and international investment.2 0
Neither ERISA nor any other U.S. law prevents pension assets from being invested
internationally. Nevertheless, investors have a preference for domestic investment, even
though modern portfolio theory would dictate international diversification.2 In other
countries, there are constraints on the cross border-investment of corporate pension fund
assets, and in countries where state pensions have been privatized, such constraints have
been imposed.
The pension asset regulations of the principal European countries where pension funds
are established reflects a strong bias against equity investments, real estate investments, and
foreign investments, with frequent requirements for investment in domestic or EU gov-
ernment bonds.222 For example, France requires assets of supplementary pensions to be
invested fifty percent in EU government bonds; Denmark requires sixty percent to be
invested in government debt. 23 The German formula of maximum guidelines-thirty per-
cent EU equity, twenty-five percent EU property, six percent non-EU shares, six percent
non-EU bonds, twenty percent overall foreign assets, and ten percent self-investment-
discourages both equity and foreign investment.2 4 As a critic of these restrictions has
pointed out, although the ostensible aim of the regulations are to protect fund beneficiaries,
motives such as insuring a steady demand for government bonds may also play a part.2-
However, these regulations prevent funds from reaching an optional trade-off between risk
and return 2 6 Further, these restrictions may violate the Treaty of Rome. 7
The European Commission has reached similar conclusions. It has pointed out that with
the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland, EU pension assets are invested primarily
in bonds, and equity and foreign holdings are small. For example, only eleven percent of
German and fourteen percent of French assets are invested in equities, and member states
invest less than ten percent in foreign assets.2 The commission has criticized and tried to
end restrictions against investment diversification by pension funds, but thus far has been
unsuccessful in doing so.2 29 However, the commission has proposed that a sound policy
objective for pension funds would be freedom to invest under the prudent man principle
and diversification of assets, including the removal of restrictions requiring or prohibiting
generally Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for that Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role for Modern Portfolio
Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokes, 24 OIo N.U. L. REv. 189 (1998) (discussion of suita-
bility).
219. See id. at 256, 270-71.
220. See id. at 253-54.
221. See James L. Cochrane et al., Foreign Equities and U.S. Investors: Breaking Down the Barriers Separating
Supply and Demand, 2 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 241, 244 (1996).
222. E. Philip Davis, Pension Fund Investments, in THE EUROPEAN EQuITY MARKETS: THE STATE OF THE
UNION AND AN AGENDA FOE THE MILLENNIUM 194 (Benn Steil ed., 1996).
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 193.
226. See id. at 216.
227. See id. at 219.
228. Supplementary Pensions in the Single Market: Green Paper from the Commission to the European
Council, COM (97) 283 final at 6.
229. See id. at 11.
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investment in particular asset classes and restrictions against cross-border investment.5 0
Countries privatizing their social security systems have not chosen international diver-
sification. From 1981 to 1991, Chilean privatized funds were barred from investing
abroad."' Restrictions have been justified as spurring domestic development and helping
to cover the costs of shifting from a government run pay-as-you-go system to a privately
managed system, although these justifications have been questioned.232 Chile had a negative
experience with its investment restrictions, which resulted in ninety-seven percent of funds
being invested in domestic monetary instruments.23 After a monetary crisis in 1981-82
threatened the collapse of the pension system, the law regarding diversification was changed
to reduce risks and diversify the portfolio of the private pension administrators.234 By 1996,
the legal ceiling for virtually all investments was fifty percent, except for a nine percent
ceiling on investment abroad.23s Nevertheless, only 0.7 percent was invested in foreign
instruments by June of 1997.236 When an economic and financial crisis led to a sharp de-
crease in local investment, foreign investment increased to only 5.3 percent by October of
1998.237
Other Latin American countries also prohibit or limit foreign investment by their pri-
vatized pension funds on the theory that capital needed for domestic development should
not be exported.13 Investment in foreign instruments is prohibited in El Salvador, Mexico,
and Uruguay, and subject to a legal ceiling of five percent in Peru, nine to ten percent in
Argentina, Colombia, and Chile, and fifty percent in Bolivia.23 9 Yet actual foreign invest-
ment is much lower than these limits, if it exists at all, perhaps due to a fear that short-run
volatility may adversely affect the annual minimum yield demanded.-' The recent priva-
tizations of state pension systems in Hungary and Poland have similarly restricted foreign
investment. Hungary limits investment in foreign instruments to thirty percent; Poland to
five percent.241
Pressure from international organizations such as the OECD and the World Bank are
likely to undo, or at least liberalize, the restrictions on foreign investment and the bias
against equity investment in the future. Such cross-border capital flows are likely to be
encouraged by U.S. pension managers, who are frequently selected to manage privatized
pension assets and who are accustomed to investment on a worldwide basis.242 Further,
crises such as the 1981-82 Chilean crisis, may demonstrate the wisdom of utilizing modem
portfolio theory in investing pension fund assets.
230. See id. Switzerland, a non-EU country, recently tried to improve the performance of its state pension
fund by expanding stock market investments until they reach 25% of the funds' value. However, only Swiss
equities have been selected. See Margaret Studer, Swiss Embrace Stocks to Buoy Social Security, WALL ST. J., Jan.
25, 1999, at A15.
231. Low Returns, Happy Returns, THE EcoNoMIST, Mar. 15, 1997, at 80.
232. See id.
233. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 8, at 435.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Comparative Featuresand Performance ofStructuralPension Reforms in LatinAmerica,
64 BROOK. L. REv. 771, 788 (1998).
237. See id. at 788-89.
238. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 8, at 436.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. Overhauled Pension System Features Privately Managed Funds, supra note 28.
242. Arend, supra note 22; Millman & Torres, supra note 22; Wayne, supra note 85; Sesit, supra note 85;
Paefgen, supra note 85; Speeckaert, supra note 85.
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IX. Conclusion
A trend toward social security privatization, or the transformation of state pension sys-
tems to private sector systems, is ongoing in transition economies and is likely to spread to
mature economies with aging populations. Further, such privatization will involve a shift
of pension investments from government bonds to private sector debt and equity securities.
The prudent investor standard, which should be applied to pension investments, in con-
junction with modern portfolio theory, dictates that the investment of pension fund assets
be diversified, and such diversification should result in cross-border investment flows. Cur-
rently, there are restrictions against such cross-border investment flows in many countries.
However, these restrictions are likely to give way because they do not accord with prudent
investor standards, and even if some restrictions remain, the amounts of money involved
in pension privatization is so huge that cross-border investment flows will be sizeable.
One of the many complex public policy issues that will have to be confronted when state
pension systems privatize is what type of investment restrictions should be imposed on the
managers of private pension funds. If the state remains a last-resort provider of social se-
curity, the safety of pension funds is a significant issue and concern. In this regard, the
development of sound workable international standards for securities regulation is an im-
portant objective so that private sector investment management can be incorporated into
privatization plans.243
This article has discussed some of the most important components of securities regulation
that international regulators and securities regulators should consider in order to promote
cross-border capital flows. The topics selected were issuer disclosure, corporate governance,
secondary trading transparency and efficiency, market fraud and manipulation, regulation
of investment managers, and insurance against intermediary insolvency. All of these topics
deserve more attention than time and space permitted for this article. Further, others might
have selected different or additional topics as key measurements of good securities regu-
lation.
The author has not cited provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws to promote U.S.
hegemony in securities regulation, but because this is the legal standard with which she is
most familiar and comfortable. It is important, in this regard, that international organiza-
tions such as IOSCO, COSRA and the FIBV, whose standards have been discussed in this
article, continue to develop and amplify international benchmarks of good securities regu-
lation, so that the views of many countries can be heard and incorporated into international
standards. Organizations such as the World Bank and the OECD should continue advo-
cating and assisting privatization of state pension systems, with a focus on the legal and
business infrastructures necessary for such pension funds to be prudently invested. Social
security privatizations could become a keystone of the new financial architecture envisioned
by those who foresee a new golden age of worldwide capitalism. Stock market crashes,
scandals, and corruption could, however, imperil the realization of such a vision.
243. The case against government or employer management has been argued in Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra
note 209, at 999-1002.
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